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ABSTRACT 
Over the years, Nigeria has adopted different monetary policy regimes with limited or no success. These ranged 
from exchange rate targeting, direct monetary controls to monetary targeting. The overall objectives of monetary 
policy have been the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and non-inflationary growth. In line with the 
global trend, Nigeria navigated towards adoption of Inflation Targeting monetary framework. But recent policy 
indication shows that the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) may have soft-pedaled in the pursuit of full-fledged 
Inflation Targeting  for the country. This paper attempted to critically analyze the basic issues, problems and 
prospects germane to the adoption of Inflation Targeting as a monetary policy framework for Nigeria. To do this, 
the paper examined the basic features and performances of inflation targeting countries globally,  adduced that 
Inflation Targeting is not “a cure-all medicine” and that it may not significantly reduce the real costs of 
disinflation in Nigeria in terms of a decline in output and an  increase in unemployment. For Nigeria, the extent 
of the success of Inflation Targeting, if and when adopted, will crucially depend on the availability of executive 
capacity, quality and timely data and the political will and commitment to the success of the programme on the 
part of monetary authorities. 
KEY WORDS: Inflation Targeting, Policy consistency, monetary authorities 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, Inflation Targeting (IT henceforth) has emerged as a dominant monetary policy strategy 
for many developed and developing countries. Account by Epstein and Yeldan (2008) showed that the IT 
monetary policy framework was adopted by twenty-four countries as at 2006.  Between 2006 and 2009 four 
additional countries joined the league of inflation targeters bringing the total number to twenty-eight (Jahan, 
2012). The only countries that have abandoned IT after they started it, according to Jahan (2012), are Finland, 
Spain, and the Slovak Republic, following the adoption of the euro as their domestic currency. Nigeria was said 
to have indicated her interest to adopt the IT framework by the year 2007 (CBN, 2007). However, to date (2014) 
no such official declaration has been made public yet. Instead, indication is that the Central Bank Nigeria (CBN) 
may have soft-pedaled in the pursuit of full-fledged IT for the country (Sanusi, 2010). The growing popularity of 
the IT framework stems from the realization that inflation constitutes a major obstacle to economic growth and 
efficient resource allocation in the economy. It is argued that inflation distorts prices, diverts capital to rent-
seeking activities, compounds social and political problems, frustrates economic planning, encourages capital 
flight, discourages savings, reduces investment, retards economic growth and development, serves as tax on the 
poor and ultimately, reduces the living conditions of the people (Debelle, 1999). 
 In order to avert these ills, monetary authorities all over the world have made conscious efforts to 
achieve low and stable inflation rates, using one form of monetary policy framework or the other. Among the 
various monetary policy frameworks so far in use include exchange rate targeting, interest rate targeting, 
monetary targeting and recently the inflation targeting. Under IT framework, price stability is explicitly stated as 
the overriding objective of monetary policy (Olekah, 2006). Nigeria at various times, adopted exchange rate 
targeting under the pegged exchange rate regime, interest rate targeting, and now monetary targeting framework 
with limited successes. According to Uchendu (2002), Nigeria’s monetary policy objectives have evolved from 
the era of multiple objectives at inception to the current implicit focus on price stability. 
 Against the above background, this paper seeks to examine the basic issues, problems and prospects for 
the adoption of IT as monetary policy framework for Nigeria. The rest of the paper is organized as follows; 
section 2, which follows the introduction, discusses the conceptual framework for IT.  In section 3, the historical 
background and country experiences are reviewed. The basic issues and problems of IT are discussed in section 
4. An attempt is made in section 5 to assess the prospects of the IT framework in Nigeria while the last section 
makes some recommendations and concludes the paper.  
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2.         CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
            Meaning of Inflation Targeting 
 There seems to be at present no general agreement on the definition of IT. Olekah (2006) noted that 
being a concept that is still evolving, the lack of universal definition should pose no surprise or constitute any 
special worry. However, at the operational level, some kind of generic characterizations could be found in the 
literature. One of such characterizations is that given by Bernake, Lauback, Mishkin and Posen (1999). 
According to Bernake el al (1999), IT is a framework for monetary policy, characterized by public 
announcement of official quantitative targets (or Target ranges) for the inflation rate over one or more time 
periods, and by explicit acknowledgement that low and stable inflation is the primary long run goal of monetary 
policy. Other features of IT as highlighted by Bernake et al (ibid)  include a vigorous effort to communicate with 
the public about the plans and objectives of the monetary authorities and measures that strengthen the central 
bank’s accountability for attaining these objectives. Also, Aliyu and Englama (2009) described IT as a monetary 
policy framework in which central banks accept and announce certain targets of inflation, over a given period of 
time, as a measure of policy anchor and are accountable for deviations of actual from set targets.  
          In another attempts, Eichengreen (2001) and Mishkin (2007) defined IT as a monetary policy strategy with 
the following characterizations: 
(i) An institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy; 
(ii) Mechanisms rendering the central bank accountable for attaining monetary policy goals; 
(iii) Public announcement of medium term numerical targets for inflation; 
(iv) An information inclusive approach in which many variables (not just monetary aggregates) are 
used in making decisions about monetary policy; and 
(v) Increased transparency of monetary policy strategy through communication with the public and 
market about the plans and objectives of monetary policy. 
From the above characterization, IT may be described as a monetary policy framework that makes explicit 
commitment to maintenance of price stability as the overriding objective of monetary policy, sets the numerical 
target for inflation over a specified time horizon and makes effective communication of same to the public, 
including explanation for deviation from targets, if and when they occur, with a view to improving the 
transparency and credibility of monetary policy and the accountability of monetary authorities.  
There are three main forms of IT that have been identified in the literature. They are: 
(i) Full- fledged IT (FFIT): This occurs when a country is ready to adopt IT as its single nominal 
anchor upon which macroeconomic stability would be achieved. It is suitable for countries with a 
robust or sound financial environment, and a central bank, which is transparent, accountable and 
highly committed to the attainment of the goals of IT. 
(ii) Eclectic IT (EIT): This occurs when a country pursues IT along with other monetary policy 
objectives in a stable financial environment which, however, is less accountable and transparent.  
(iii)    Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL): This is a low profile form of IT pursued by countries,      largely due to 
lack of strong or credible macroeconomic environment. ITL countries float their exchange rate and 
announce an inflation target, but are not able to maintain the inflation target as the foremost policy 
objective (Aliyu and Englama, 2009).  
 
The operational procedure of IT framework requires that the central bank forecasts the future path of 
inflation and compares it with the target inflation rate (the rate the government believes is appropriate for the 
economy). The difference between the forecast and the target inflation rates determines how much monetary 
policy has to be adjusted. More often than not, IT countries set their inflation targets in the low single digits but 
not at zero since that would not allow real interest rates to fall sufficiently to stimulate overall demand when a 
central bank is trying to boost the economy (Jahan, 2012). 
 
Arguments for and against IT  
Argument for IT 
Both theoretical and empirical arguments have been adduced to justify the increasing popularity and 
support which IT has enjoyed over the past two decades. First, it is argued that Economists and policy makers 
have become less confident in using monetary aggregates to effectively moderate short run fluctuations in the 
economy. This is based on the monetarist’s argument that an increase in money supply does not affect the real 
sector of the economy in the long run, although it may have temporary effects in the short run. Even then, the 
mechanism through which the effects of changes in money supply manifest themselves and the time when they 
manifest are not well known. In contrast, it is agreed that inflation rate is the only macroeconomic variable that 
maintains a strong and direct relationship with monetary policy. Therefore, when monetary policy makers target 
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a low rate of inflation as their long run goal, they are simply accepting the reality of what monetary policy can or 
cannot do (Olekah, 2006). 
Second, empirical evidences have tended to support a negative correlation between economic growth 
and inflation (Barro, 1995; Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Ghosh and Phillips, 1998; Krueger, 2005; Bassey and 
Onwioduokit, 2011). This negative relationship suggests that a policy that seeks to reduce inflation is growth 
inducing. Third, it is further argued that IT is readily understood by the public and therefore very transparent. 
Monetary targeting is less likely to be understood by the public and may not adequately reflect the stance of 
monetary policy. Also, by committing itself to price stability, monetary authority is held accountable for success 
of the policy. 
 
Fourth, according to Heintz and Ndikumana (2010) it is frequently argued that a formal IT allows 
inflation to be controlled at lower cost than other approaches to monetary policy that focus on reducing inflation. 
In other words, IT is said to reduce the ‘sacrifice ratio’ – the amount of output or employment which must be 
forgone to reduce inflation by a certain amount. 
A fifth major advantage of inflation targeting as noted by Jahan (2012) is that it combines elements of 
both “rules” and “discretion” in monetary policy. This “constrained discretion” framework combines two distinct 
elements: a precise numerical target for inflation in the medium term and a response to economic shocks in the 
short term. Thus, rather than focusing on achieving the target at all times, the approach emphasizes achieving the 
target over the medium term—typically over a two- to three-year horizon. This allows policy to address other 
objectives—such as smoothing output—over the short term. Thus, IT provides a rule-like framework within 
which the central bank has the discretion to react to shocks. Because IT focuses on medium-term, policy makers 
need not feel compelled to meet targets on a year – to – year  basis.  
Lastly, IT is said to minimize the time inconsistency problem in monetary policy management. Under 
IT regime, policy makers resist the incentive to inflate the economy because of their commitment to a stable and 
low inflation environment. It also encourages effective and regular communication of policy direction and 
intentions to the public, thereby enhancing transparency and discipline in policy formulation and implementation 
(Bernanke et al, 1999). 
 
Arguments against IT 
In spite of its many benefits, the IT framework is not without some limitations. Some of these 
limitations are highlighted in the works of Epstein and Yeldan (2006 and 2008), Kadioglu, Ozdemir and Yilmar  
(2000) and Bernanke, et al (1999). First, it is argued that the general notion that the top priority of central banks 
should be to keep inflation as low as possible is neither optimal nor desirable. According to Epstein and Yeldan 
(2006), the notion is based on the mistaken belief that inflation of any magnitude has a negative impact on output 
and that economies perform best and generate high levels of economic growth and employment under lower 
rates of inflation. On the contrary, Epstein and Yeldan (ibid) argued that experiences have shown that moderate 
rates of inflation have very low or no cost and that IT countries have not performed better than non-IT countries 
in terms of employment generation and economic growth. Succinctly, Epstein and Yeldan (2006 :3) argued that: 
After several decades of experience with this inflation focused-market based approach, the 
policy record has been rather disappointing for many countries. In a number of countries, 
inflation has come down, to be sure, but it is questionable to what extent the drop in inflation is 
due to changes in domestic monetary policy, rather than the overall global fall in inflation. 
Moreover, even if domestic monetary policy has reduced inflation, the hoped for gains in 
employment have, generally, not materialized; and, for many countries following this orthodox 
approach, economic growth has not significantly increased. 
 
In line with this reasoning, Bernanke, et al. (1999) argued that IT does not reduce the real cost of disinflation 
while Pollin and Zhu (2006) submitted that a higher inflation is associated with moderate gains in GDP growth 
rate up to 15-18 percent inflation threshold. 
Second, the much vaunted accountability and credibility properties of IT is said to be doubtful. 
Bernanke, et al. (1999) returned “no credibility bonus” while Epstein and Yeldan (2008) argued that the 
supposedly “independence” of the central bank means that they would become less accountable to their 
governments and more accountable to financial elites and international organizations such as IMF. The 
accountability and credibility arguments are further weakened by the fact that inflation is difficult to control and 
the policy instruments show their impacts on inflation after a long and variable lag. 
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It is further argued that IT may not prevent fiscal dominance of the government. The existence of fiscal 
dominance particularly where large deficits are financed through signorage as is the case in many LDCs tends to 
limit the independence of the central bank and undermine the effectiveness of IT framework. More so, there is 
the possibility of conflict of interest between the central bank and politicians which may weaken the 
cohesiveness of IT framework. Still on the weakness of IT, Pui (2003) as cited in Aliyu and Englama (2009) 
cautioned that IT in its pure sense (where output and economic growth are given no weights) is not likely to 
maximize social welfare since the contraction or expansion of the economy does not matter so long as the 
inflation target is met. 
Finally, the IT framework is criticized as being too rigid by insisting on price stability as the overriding 
objective of monetary policy. This limits the ability of the central bank to respond to unforeseen circumstances. 
An extension of this argument is that by focusing on price stability, the central bank ignores the important 
developmental role it can play in the economy. It is argued that in particular, employment creation, poverty 
reduction and more rapid development should be added to price stabilization role of the central bank. (Epstein 
and Yeldan, 2006) 
 
3.         HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 
Inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework has a recent origin. The framework started in 1990 
with New Zealand and Chile being the first two countries to adopt it (Olekah 2006). Before that time, the 
dominant framework were exchange rate targeting, adopted by many countries after the abandonment of the 
Breton Wood system in 1972 and the monetary targeting framework. These two countries (New Zealand and 
Chile) were followed in quick successions by UK and Canada in 1991, and Sweden, Finland and Australia in 
1993. 
Within Africa, South Africa became the first country to join the league of IT countries in 2000. In West 
African sub-region, Ghana adopted implicit inflation targeting in 2002 and formerly joined the league of 
inflation targeters in 2007. On the whole, the rate at which both industrialized and non-industrialized countries 
embraced IT framework has been overwhelming. Epstein and Yeldan (2008) reported that of the 88 non-
industrialized countries surveyed by IMF, more than half had expressed the desire to adopt explicit or implicit 
quantitative inflation targets. The full list of IT countries and other candidate countries is presented in the Table1 
below as captured in Epstein and Yeldan (2008) and modified in Jahan.(2012). 
Table 1: List of IT Countries 
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
New Zealand, Canada, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Iceland, 
Norway, Australia. 
Israel, Chez Rep, Poland, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, South Africa, 
Thailand, Korea Mexico, Hungary, 
Peru, Philippines, Albania, Slovak 
Rep., Indonesia, Romania, Turkey, 
Serbia, Armenia and Ghana. 
Near term 1-2 years. 
Costa Rica, Egypt and Ukraine. 
Middle term 3-5 years. 
 Botswana, Dominican Rep, 
Guatemala, Mauritius, Uganda, 
Angola, Azerbaijan Georgia, 
Moldova, Sri Lanker, Vietnam and 
Zambia.  
Long term 5 years and above. 
Belarus, China, Kenya, Kyrgyz 
Rep., Bolivia, Honduras, Nigeria, 
Papua, New guinea, Sudan, 
Tunisia, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
SOURCE: Epstein, G. and Yeldan, E. (2008). P. 25,  (ii) Jahan, S. (2012) 
        The main features of IT as practiced by some of the full fledged IT countries are presented in Table 2. The 
Table indicates that about twenty countries targeted inflation rate of below 5 percent while four countries set the 
lower band of their inflation target above 5 percent. Only two countries, Israel and Ghana, set the upper band of 
their inflation target up to 10 percent. In terms of the target range, almost all the countries, with the exception of 
Israel and Ghana, maintained a target range of below 3 percent. It is important to note that while majority of the 
countries prefer to use a target range, others adopt point target instead. In the majority of the countries, the 
inflation targets are set by the central bank while in a few others, they are set by the government. Only two 
countries have their inflation targets set jointly by the central bank and the government. Of the twenty-three 
countries examined, with data on inflation type {see column (5)}, ten of them targeted core inflation while 
thirteen used headline inflation or consumer price index (CPI). With the exception of United Kingdom, which set 
its inflation target horizon at four years to correspond with its Parliamentary tenure, all other countries surveyed 
maintained target horizon of not more than three years. 
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Table 2:  Main Features of IT Countries 
S/N COUNTRY 
  
 (1) 
ADOPTION 
DATE  
(2) 
INFLATION 
TARGET % 
(3) 
TARGET 
SETTER 
(4) 
INFATION 
TYPE 
(5) 
TARGET 
HORIZON 
(6) 
    1. New Zealand 1990 0-3 Jointly Core Yearly 
2. Canada 1991 1-3 Jointly CPI 1-3years 
3 Israel 1991 7-10 Govt. CPI Yearly 
4. United 
Kingdom 
1992 2.5 Govt. Core Parliamentary 
Tenure (4yrs) 
5. Sweden 1993 1-3 CB CPI 3 years 
6. Finland 1993 2 CB Core N/A 
7. Spain 1994 Below 2 CB CPI 2 years 
8. Australia 1994 2-3 CB Core Medium term 
9. Czech. Rep. 1997 1-3 CB CPI N/A 
10. Brazil 1997 2-4 MPC Core N/A 
11. Poland 1998 2.0-4 CB CPI N/A 
12. Chile 1999 5-7 CB Core N/A 
13. Colombia 1999 5-6 CB CPI N/A 
14. South Africa 2000 3-4 Govt. Core N/A 
15. Korea 2000 2.5 CB Core N/A 
16. Thailand 2000 2-3 CB Core N/A 
17. Switzerland 2000 Below 2 Govt. CPI N/A 
18. Hungary 2001 5-7 CB Core N/A 
19. Iceland 2001 2.5 CB CPI N/A 
20. Mexico 2001 2-4 CB CPI N/A 
21. Norway 2001 2.5 CB CPI N/A 
22. Peru 2002 2.5 CB Core N/A 
23. The Philippines 2002 5-6 CB CPI N/A 
24. Slovak rep. 2005 2.5-4.5 CB N/A N/A 
25. Indonesia 2005 5.5 N/A N/A N/A 
26. Romania 2005 7.5-8.5 N/A N/A N/A 
27. Turkey 2006 3-7 N/A N/A N/A 
28. Armenia 2006 3-6 N/A N/A N/A 
29. Serbia 2006 4-8 N/A N/A N/A 
30. Ghana 2007 6.5-10.5 N/A N/A N/A 
31. Albania 2009 2-4 N/A N/A N/A 
 
 Source:   (i) Bernanke et al. (1999), pp. 86-250.  (ii) Epstein and Yeldan (2008.) p. 25. 
                (iii) Olekah (2006), pp. 45-73.         (iv) Jahan, S. (2012) 
 
The overall performance of macro economic indicators of IT countries have been found to be mixed. 
Table 3, adopted from Epstein and Yeldan (2008) provides information on selected macroeconomic aggregates 
and prices taken as annual five years average before and after the adoption of IT. From the Table, it is seen that 
one-third of countries surveyed reported the decline in their growth rate after the adoption of IT, while the others 
showed no major shift on their growth rates. The Table further shows a significant increase in the rate of 
unemployment in the post IT era. 
With respect to inflation rate performance, Table 3 shows a significant reduction in the post IT era in 
almost all the countries except Indonesia and Switzerland. Looking at the real exchange rate movement, the 
Table shows a general tendency towards appreciated currencies on the aftermath of the adoption of IT. Epstein 
and Yeldan (2008) attributed this appreciation to increased expansion of foreign capital inflows due to global 
financial glut.  
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TABLE 3: Performance of Selected Macroeconomic Indicators in the IT Countries (Annual Average of 5 
years to Adoption of IT and after Adoption) 
COUNTRIES Growth Rate Unemployment Rate Inflation Rate Exchange Rate 
Before After Before After Before After Before After 
New Zealand 2.7 3.0 4.2 6.9 11.6 2.2 -7.6 -0.6 
Canada 2.9 2.8 8.4 8.7 4.5 2.1 -7.5 -7.1 
UK 2.2 2.7 7.4 5.2 6.4 2.6 -2.4 -2.2 
Sweden 0.8 2.7 2.8 6.1 6.9 1.5 -8.5 -1.2 
Australia 2.2 3.9 8.6 7.3 4.2 2.5 -6.9 -1.1 
Israel 5.8 3.1 8.5 9.4 11.3 3.1 -4.2 0.9 
Czech Rep. 4.5 3.2 4.0 8.9 9.1 3.1 -6.6 -6.2 
Poland 7.9 3.7 14.3 16.7 24.1 4.7 -4.5 -4.8 
Brazil 3.2 2.3 7.0 9.8 819.2 7.9 -48.0 5.5 
Colombia 3.3 2.3 11.1 15.8 20.4 7.5 -9.5 0.5 
Mexico 1.7 4.8 2.7 1.9 24.5 7.2 28 -4.6 
South Africa 2.6 3.8 Na 27.7 7.3 5.1 4.3 -2.5 
Switzerland 1.4 1.7 4.1 3.1 0.8 1.0 1.6 -3.7 
Thailand 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.4 5.1 2.2 4.5 -1.0 
Korea 4.6 4.5 4.4 3.7 4.0 3.3 6.0 -5.0 
Hungary 4.2 4.2 8.0 6.1 15.2 5.9 2. -12.4 
Peru 2.0 5.2 7.8 10.2 5.0 1.9      -1.6 1.4 
Philippines 3.1 5.1 10.2 11.5 6.3 5.0 8.5   -3.0 
Indonesia 4.6 5.6 6.5 10.3 8.0 15.5 -6.2 -1.9 
Turkey 4.5 7.8 9.9 10.4 28.3 10.5 -6.3 -1.2 
Source: Epstein and Yeldan (2008) Pp. 26-27 
         In Nigeria, various monetary policy regimes have been adopted over the years, including exchange rates 
targeting and monetary targeting (MT) (Uchendu 2006). The last mentioned MT, has been in practice since 1993 
in Nigeria. Monetary targeting  entails setting intermediate targets (M2) and operating target [interest rates, 
exchange rates and minimum rediscount rate (MMR) and Open Market Operations (OMO)] in tandem with the 
assumed target for GDP growth, inflation rate and balance of payments (CBN, 2007). This monetary policy 
framework is based on the assumption that there is a stable relationship between monetary variables (such as 
money and domestic credits) and real sector variables such as output and prices. As noted by Agba (2006), the 
effectiveness of monetary targeting depends on the strength of relationship between the target variable (M2) and 
the policy instruments. It also depends on the stability of the demand for money function (Mbutor, 2006). 
However, the volatile nature of our oil driven economy, coupled with a tradition of policy inconsistencies and 
absence of policy independence conspired to frustrate the effectiveness of these policies in Nigeria. Hence, the 
search for an alternative monetary policy framework began with the granting of instrument autonomy to the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 1998.  
In recognition of lags in monetary policy, the CBN in 2002 shifted the focus of monetary policy to 
medium term. Under this framework, monetary growth targets that are consistent with inflation and real output 
growth targets were set over a two year period. In addition, the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) which became the 
anchor rate was introduced to replace the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MMR). Furthermore, the bank 
consolidation programme introduced in 2005 was designed to strengthen and deepen the financial sector. In 2007 
a new CBN Act, which gave the Bank broader independence, was enacted to include the provision of transparent 
and credible framework to lock in inflationary expectation through the adoption of inflation target as the nominal 
anchor for monetary policy (CBN 2007). Within the same year the Fiscal Responsibility Act, was signed which 
sought to reduce the size of banking system’s financing of public sector deficits while the Monetary Policy 
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Committee (MPC) was set up, under the chairmanship of the Governor of CBN  formulate monetary and credit 
policy for the country, among other things.  Uchendu (2006) further noted that the launching of the financial 
sector strategy (FSS) 2020 added vigour towards the implementation of inflation targeting framework in Nigeria, 
since the policy hinges on strategic objective of achieving low and single digit. 
In what looks like a policy shift however, the CBN in 2010 announced that it has soft-pedaled on the 
march toward adopting a full-fledged IT for Nigeria. The CBN Governor was reported to have said that Nigeria 
will not pursue the achievement of single digit inflation at the expense of economic growth and poverty 
alleviations (Mazen and Kay, 2012). In the words of the CBN Governor:  
I have always held the view that a central bank governor in an emerging economy like 
Nigeria must balance the desire for low inflation with the critical need for economic growth and 
poverty alleviation. It is for this reason that I soft-pedaled on the CBN’s earlier effort to fast-
track to an explicit inflation-targeting regime. The evidence for inflation targeting in poor 
countries remains dubious and francophone West Africa is a case in point. As we stand today, 
countries like Botswana have abandoned the policy. New Zealand, Brazil and Argentina are 
having second thoughts about the wisdom of pursuing a very low inflation target. Even IMF 
officials have recently advised the central banks in advanced countries, including the ECB to 
relax their target. There is a raging debate in South Africa over the SARB’s insistence on 
maintaining an inflation target of 3-6% at a time of very weak GDP growth. So while the 
Central Bank will continue to maintain price stability, it will be an active player in the economic 
development space and encourage policies  and reforms that lead to the growth of the real 
economy, including attracting foreign investment into critical sectors ((Sanusi, 2012: p 19). 
 
 This policy rethink on the adoption of IT framework raises serious concern as to what viable alternative 
policy framework is left at the kitties of CBN. The concern arises from the fact that the country had earlier 
experimented on the exchange rate targeting and now, on monetary targeting with limited or no success. Because 
a policy reversal at this point without a viable alternative may turn out to be very costly for the country, it is 
pertinent to take a hard look at the issues and problems of implementation of IT for Nigeria. 
 
4.         ISSUSES AND PROBLEMS OF INFLATION TARGETING FOR NIGERIA 
The analysis so far on the experiences of IT countries suggests that IT framework is not a “cure all 
medicine”. A good deal depends on the political will of authorities to do the right things at the right time. It also 
depends on choice of appropriate target, effective means of communication with the public, ensuring central 
bank independence and accountability, etc. Nigeria has un-enviable record of formulating good policies but 
which have failed because of poor implementation. In order to avoid a repeat of past policy implementation 
errors, the following issues and problems need to be properly addressed and discussed. 
  Appropriate Timing for Inflation Targeting 
         The first pertinent issue to consider is what should be the appropriate time to introduce IT. A common 
sense would dictate that IT should commence once inflation becomes a serious threat to an economy. However, 
the experiences from IT countries have shown that IT is best introduced after a successful period of disinflation. 
Bernanke et al. (2008) have argued that the practice is borne out of political expediency, namely the need to meet 
the initial inflation target in order to gain credibility for the new regime. The choice is also advised by the need 
to “lock in” earlier disinflationary gains, particularly in the face of one time inflationary shock. 
       
  A cursory look at Table 4  reveals that although the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has in the past fifteen years 
put a deserving emphasis on price stability as the major goal of monetary policy, there seemed to be no concrete 
evidence of any serious attempt at disinflation. Both the money supply (M2) and domestic credit continued to 
show expansionary trend, reaching their peaks in 2008 at 56.1 and 88.6 respectively against the background of 
rising costs of funds and depreciating Naira exchange rate. As a consequence, the rate of inflation rose to double 
digits except in two short periods, 1999 and 2000 and 2006 and 2007 respectively. In those two periods, the 
monetary policy objective of achieving a single digit inflation rate was sustained. From 2009 however, both M2 
and credit to private sector assumed a declining trend, thus forcing down the trend in the rate of inflation. Unless 
the  downward trend is sustained over the next 2 to 3 years, it would be unadvisable to introduce IT for fear of 
losing credibility due to serious target misses. 
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Table 4: Monetary Policy Indicators and Inflation Rate in Nigeria. 
Year Money Stock 
Growth Rate (M2) 
Credit To Domestic 
Economy (Growth 
Rate) 
Minimum 
Rediscount 
Rate (MRR) 
Inflation Rate Exchange Rate 
1997 16.0 -1.4 13.5 8.5 21 
1998 22.3 42.0 14.3 10.0 21.8 
1999 33.1 21.7 18.0 6.6 92.6 
2000 48.1 -25.3 13.5 6.9 102.1 
2001 27.0 79.9 14.3 18.9 111.9 
2002 21.6 56.6 19.0 12.9 121.0 
2003 24.1 35.7 15.8 14.0 129.4 
2004 14.0 12.0 15.0 15.0 133.5 
2005 16.0 14.5 13.0 17.9 131.7 
2006 53.4 7.7 13.0 8.2 128.1 
2007 35.0 60.1 8.7 6.6 125.1 
2008 56.1 88.6 9.8 15.1 117.7 
2009 17.5 31.5 7.4 13.9 147.2 
2010 17.3 11.6 6.1 11.8 148.3 
2011 10.3 4.9 9.2 10.3 151.8 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2006 and 2011 
   Choosing and Defining the Target 
         There is hardly any generally acceptable definition of price stability, despite the much rhetoric about it in 
policy circles. While Bernanke et al. (1999) defined price stability as “the rate of inflation so low that businesses 
and households do not have to take it into account in making everyday decisions”, Owoye (2007) defined price 
stability in Nigeria as “the attainment of single-digit inflation rate on an annual basis”. Bernanke et al. (1999) 
argued that a zero rate of inflation may not be suitable as an inflation target, and explained that maintenance of 
zero rate of inflation may precipitate unemployment by preventing real wage from falling in the face of declining 
demand. Also, a low or zero rate of inflation may induce low level of nominal interest rate, leaving the Central 
Bank with very little room to lower interest in the face of recession. Therefore, an inflation target or a stable 
price regime should be one in which inflationary expectation can be effectively anchored. 
 
Another conceptual issue relates to what should be the appropriate price index to use as a measure of 
inflation target. The popular measures of inflation used are the core inflation, which takes account of the effect 
of the first round of price increase due to supply or demand shocks and the headline inflation based on Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). In Nigeria, for fear of excessive target misses which may weaken credibility, the core 
inflation measures should be considered. Also given the country’s long history of high inflation rates, a target 
band of 8-11 percent would seem realistic. On the issue of who sets the target for the purposes of assigning and 
shouldering responsibility, it is suggested that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) should set the target. The 
MPC membership consists of the Governor who is the Chairman, four deputy Governors of CBN, two members 
of the board of Directors of CBN, three appointees of the President and two appointees of the Banker’s 
Committee. This will greatly enhance the independence and professionalism of the Monetary Authority. In 
addition, given the fact that price stability operates within the medium to long term frame work, a target horizon 
of 2-3 years should be appropriate. 
Missing of Inflation Targets and the Credibility Issue. 
         Missing of inflation target is inevitable under IT due to unexpected external and internal shocks into the 
system. Moreover, deliberate target misses may be allowed to correct other short-term instabilities in the 
macroeconomic aggregates. It should be noted however, that misses do not suggest that the entire programme is 
derailed. On this note, Bernanke et al (2008)argued that so long as the central bank is able to explain that the 
misses are as a result of unforeseen events, the credibility of the central bank need not be compromised. This 
calls for the existence of an effective communication apparatus between the monetary authorities and the public. 
In many of the IT countries, this is done through regular inflation reports published mostly on quarterly basis by 
the Central Bank. The CBN has a number of monthly, quarterly and yearly reports on major developments in the 
financial sector and the economy generally. However, there is need to institute a special report on inflation 
targeting if and when adopted. 
 
Need for the Central Bank Independence 
         For the Central Bank to be held accountable for the success or failure of its monetary policy, it should be 
allowed a good measure of instrument and policy independence. As already noted, the Central Bank Act of 1998 
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allowed the Bank instrument autonomy and this was further broadened by Central Bank (Amendment) Act of 
2007. Under the 2007 Act, the CBN is empowered “to provide a transparent and credible framework… through 
the adoption of inflation target as the nominal anchor for monetary policy”. To enhance accountability and 
flexibility, the CBN powers should only be limited by the requirement that it submits annual inflation reports to 
the National Assembly. 
          The ability of the CBN to exercise its discretionary powers under the Act depends crucially on the fiscal 
posture of the government. A situation where a large percentage of government debt is financed by the CBN 
could encourage fiscal dominance and undermine the autonomy of the CBN. Nanna (2001) reported that in 
Nigeria, government fiscal operations, especially, the inflationary financing of large budgetary deficits and the 
monetization of deficits, have continued to pose serious challenges to monetary management. The setting of 
strict limits on the financing of government deficits by the CBN has not been successful despite the Bank’s 
operational autonomy. There is also the need to encourage the deepening of the capital market to provide 
alterative source of financing government debts. 
 
Table 5:   Federal Government Borrowing from the Banking System (Net): Indicator of Fiscal      
Dominance by the Government (₦ Million) 
year Total Credit to 
Domestic 
Economy (Nm)    
(1) 
Fed. Govt. 
credit 
(Nm) 
(2) 
CBN Finance 
of Fed Govt. 
credit (Nm) 
(3) 
% of Govt. 
Credit to total 
        
     (4) 
% of 
CBN’s  
Credit to 
Govt.  (5) 
Govt. Fiscal 
Deficit 
% of GDP 
       (6) 
1998 519,510.6 133,929.0 88,568.2 25.8 66.1 -4.92 
 
1999 632,010.1 176,804.9 15,325.1 28.0 8.7 -8.93 
 
2000 472,011.7 -123,989.8 -343,003.3 -26.3 -276.6 -2.26 
 
2001 848,992.8 6,006.5 -185,934.6 -21.9 -3095.6 -4.68 
 
2002 1,329,401.3 373,639.2 -41,246.8 -11.0 -11.0 -4.36 
 
2003 1,803,938.1 591,944.7 254,128.6 14.1 42.9 -2.39 
 
2004 2,020,173.3 483,725.5 -6,118.9 -0.003 -1.3 -1.51 
 
2005 2,313,387.7 306,031.9 205,746.3 8.9 -67.2 -1.11 
 
2006 714,205.7 
 
-1,915,007.3 -2,796,028.5 -59.5 -146.0 -0.55 
 
2007 2,710,898.6 
 
-2,368,484.4 -4,074,422.8 -87.4 -172.0 -0.57 
 
2008 4,951,860.3 
 
-3,107,688.6 -4,532,113.6 
 
-62.8 -145.8 -0.20 
 
2009 7,917,041.4 
 
-2,302,294.7 
 
-3,731,603.8 -29.1 -162,0 -3.27 
 
2010 8,708,545.45 
 
1,121,798.63 
 
-2,884,013.4 
 
12.9 -257.1 -3.25 
 
2011 13,686,730.2 
 
-496,861.6 -3,514,447.1 -3.63  -707.3 -3.09 
 
Source:  CBN Bulletin 2006 and 2011 
     
         As can be seen from Table 5, although in 1998, the federal government credit accounted for 66.1 percent of 
the total CBN credit, it reduced sharply to 8.7 percent by 1999. Beginning from 2000, the federal government 
became a net supplier of funds to the banking system, except in 2003 and 2005. This means that government has 
alternative source of financing its deficit other than the banking system. The implication here is that the CBN 
may not be fettered in the conduct of its monetary policy, by over-bearing fiscal posture of the Federal 
Government. However, as can be gleaned from  Table 5, the effort to curtail fiscal dominance of the government 
could not be sustained as the percentage of fiscal deficit to GDP increased from 0.2 percent in 2008 to 3.09 
percent in 2011. There is, therefore, the need for effective policy coordination to ensure that the efforts of the 
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Central Bank at ensuring price stability are not scuttled by excessive fiscal profligacy on the part of the 
government. 
5.      THE PROSPECTS FOR IT IN NIGERIA 
         The prospects for the adoption and implementation of IT framework in Nigeria depend, as earlier 
mentioned, on the availability of certain critical success factors among which are: 
i) A Prolonged Period of Disinflation:  
According to Bernanke, et al. (1999) a prolonged period of disinflation of four to six years is required to 
precede the introduction of IT. This should allow the set inflation target to anchor inflationary 
expectation, thereby ensuring achievement of the target and the credibility of the policy. In Nigeria, the 
process of disinflation started with the declaration in 2006 that the attainment of a single-digit rate of 
inflation is the primary objective of the  monetary authorities (CBN, 2007). However, there were major 
deviations from this target between 2008 and 2009, when inflation rate rose from 6.6 in 2007 to 15.1 
percent 2009. Interestingly, as Table 4 shows, from 2009 there was a steady decline in the rate of 
inflation from 13.9 in 2009 to 10.3 percent in 2011, indicating a possible commencement of a period of 
disinflation in Nigeria. If this trend  were sustained over the next three years, there would have been  the 
prospect that IT framework could conveniently be introduced in the country. 
 
ii) Independence of the Central Bank of Nigeria:  
As already discussed above, the ability of the CBN to exercise independent monetary discretion is a 
crucial factor for the success of the IT framework. The need for a truly independent central bank in the 
success equation of IT framework is predicated on the causal link between monetary policy autonomy 
and inflation. Generally, it is argued that a central bank is exposed to strong political pressure to adopt 
lax monetary policies due to budgetary and seigniorage considerations. An independent central bank 
will be less subject to these short-term political influences, thus, is better able to commit to long-term 
policies for promoting price stability. It is further argued that a strong and independent central bank can 
persuade the government to take measures to reduce the deficit or the volume of outstanding debt. In a 
memorandum submitted to the National Assembly in 2012, the CBN made a strong case for its 
independence thus: 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), like most other central banks, has the core 
mandate of maintaining price stability and ensuring a non-inflationary growth. It also 
has the responsibility to ensure a sound and stable financial system in addition to 
other developmental functions. These mandates and functions are peculiar to central 
banks all over the world, and no other institution performs such functions. These 
special responsibilities are enormous and have continued to pose increasing 
challenges to central banks, largely because developments in the domestic and 
international economies create more intricacies and complexities in the financial 
systems and the art of central banking. Indeed, the current trend of globalization 
exemplified by economic and monetary unions has increased the challenges to central 
banking. The effective discharge of these responsibilities requires that central banks 
be independent in the true sense of it, that is, shielded from political interferences, 
have administrative independence and instrument autonomy (CBN, 2012). 
 
The enactments of Fiscal Responsibility Act and the Central Bank (Amendment) Act in 2007 were 
meant to curtail fiscal excesses/dominance of the government and increase the administrative and 
instrument autonomy of the CBN. 
 
 In 2012 however, the National Assembly proposed an amendment to the CBN Act, 2007 
which sought to compromise the independence of the CBN. In particular, the amendment sought to 
compel the CBN to submit its annual budget to the National Assembly for approval, provided for the 
appointment of “a person other than the Governor as the Chairman of the Board of the Bank”, excluded 
Deputy Governors and directors as members of the Board and divested the Board of the power of 
consideration and approval of the annual budget of the Bank (CBN 2012). Doubtless, these 
amendments, if passed by the National Assembly would cripple CBN’s independence and consequently 
obstruct its ability to deliver on its core mandate of maintaining price stability and ensuring a non-
inflationary growth. This would in turn deem the prospect of early introduction of IT in Nigeria. 
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iii) Transparency and Accountability 
Successful implementation of the IT framework requires that the CBN must be transparent and 
accountable in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. This further requires the 
institutionalization of a system for effective coordination and communication of its policy intents as 
well as a demonstration of a firm commitment to maintenance of price stability as overriding objective 
of monetary policy. While assessing the readiness of Nigeria for the adoption of IT, Aliyu and Englama 
(2009: 10) reports that: 
 The day-to-day activities of the CBN are quite transparent and truly accountable as 
enshrined the CBN Act. Information about the bank’s activities is available on a daily 
basis on the bank’s website. Besides, a wide range of monetary and financial data is 
published at regular intervals. The Bank is also expected to make public at all times, 
its monetary policy rate (MPR). 
. 
A committee which is strategic in this regard is the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) which 
communicates its decisions to the public immediately after its meeting which holds bi-monthly.  
 
iv) Virile Financial Market by  Depth and Breadth 
In the first place, a virile financial market is needed in order to provide alterative source of financing for 
government debts. This will  reduce the incentive to finance public debt through inflation tax (Ways and 
Means Advances) which may compromise the independence of the central bank. Secondly, a sound 
financial system is essential to guarantee an efficient transmission of monetary policy through the 
interest rate channel which constitutes a major channel through which the central bank carries out its 
main objective of price stability. Thirdly, according to Mishkin (2004), a weak banking sector is 
potentially problematic to achieve inflation target, because the central bank would be hesitant to raise 
short-term interest rates for fear that this will impact on the profitability of banks and lead to a collapse 
of the financial system. Finally, countries characterized by weak financial institutions are said to be 
more vulnerable to a sudden stop of capital outflows, causing a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate 
which may lead to upward pressures on the inflation rate (Mishkin, 2004).  
 
In the light of the above convincing arguments for a virile financial market in an IT monetary 
policy regime, it is pertinent to examine the extent the Nigerian financial market can meet these 
expectations. Of recent, a number of financial sector reforms have taken place to reposition the sector 
for improved performance. One of such reforms is the Bank recapitalization and consolidation policy of 
2005. Empirical evidences on the impact of the policy on financial sector development have produced 
mixed results. Account by Bassey (2012) showed that while the exercise has boosted capital market 
development, level of monetization of the economy and market capitalization of the Nigeria Stock 
Exchange, it has also reduced asset/deposit ratio significantly and hence the efficiency of the banks and 
their profitability. Other reforms carried out include the enactments of Fiscal Responsibility Act and the 
Central Bank (Amendment) Act in 2007 which were meant to curtail fiscal excesses/dominance of the 
government. Others include the establishment of Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) 
to fight distress conditions and improve the quality of bank assets, the establishment of Financial 
Stability Committee (FSC) to ensure systemic stability within the financial sector and the introduction 
of the Cash-less policy. 
. 
Despite these laudable efforts, the Nigerian financial sector is yet to attain the level of 
efficiency that will enable it serve as a catalyst for effective implementation of IT framework in 
Nigeria. This is because of certain structural defects inherent in the system. Sanusi (2010) described the 
Nigerian financial system as being characterized by eight major structural defects, namely, financial 
instability caused by large and sudden capital inflows, poor corporate governance at banks, lack of 
investor and consumer sophistication, gaps in regulatory framework and regulations, uneven 
supervision and enforcement, unstructured governance/weakness within the CBN and weakness in the 
business environment. Unless these identified defects are properly addressed, the prospect of an early 
commencement of IT framework may not materialize.   
 
v) Existence of Stable and Predictable Relationship between Monetary Policy Instruments and 
Inflation. 
 
Important to the attainment of a sound monetary policy is the identification of a reliable 
monetary transmission mechanism, which best communicates monetary actions to the desired target. 
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Under inflation targeting, the interest rate is the main monetary policy tool for influencing activity and 
inflation (Stone, et al., 2009). Because interest rates and inflation rates tend to move in opposite 
directions, the likely actions a central bank will take to raise or lower interest rates become more 
transparent under an inflation targeting regime. Advocates of inflation targeting think this leads to 
increased economic stability (Jahan, 2012). In Nigeria, it is doubtful if the monetary policy rate (MPR) 
can be effectively used to anchor inflationary expectation. The ability of the CBN to use MPR to 
stabilize the price level depends crucially on the fiscal posture of the government. So long as 
government fiscal deficit continues to grow, the CBN is arms tied to relax its monetary policy stance to 
boost output and employment. At present the MPR is continuously set at a high rate of between 11-12 
percent which translates to interest rate in the real sector of 20 percent. The CBN Governor is reported 
to have said that “rate reductions will depend on whether the government can control spending. The 
central bank shouldn’t rush into cutting rates and then raising. How much room we have to cut depends 
on what happens in the fiscal space” (Akinade, 2013).Meanwhile, the manufacturers and others in the 
real sector are crying out against the high interest rate as being detrimental to the growth of the 
economy since it limits accessibility to cheap credit. Obviously, there seems to be a disconnection 
between the fiscal and monetary policy coordination in the country. The real implication here is that 
there is extent to which price stability can be maintained without hurting growth. A situation whereby 
the CBN cannot vary its policy rates to deal with short term fluctuations in the economy may not augur 
well for the functioning of IT framework. 
 
vi) Maintenance of a Stable and Flexible Exchange Regime 
 
A key to a successful transition from a non-IT to an IT monetary framework is the establishment of a 
systematic, consistent and market-based exchange rate regime for the country. According to Stone, et al 
(2009), using the exchange rate as the operating policy target can generate better macroeconomic 
performance than using a policy reaction function dominated by the interest rates. The choice of 
operating target during the transition, as argued by Stone (ibid), depends on the degree of domestic 
money market development. Central banks moving toward inflation targeting generally need to 
strengthen their macroeconomic analysis and develop a systematic approach to policy decision-making. 
Epstein and Yeldan (2006) have argued that an important requirement for the smooth transition to IT 
framework is the implementation of flexible exchange rate regime. Accordingly, the central banks 
should abandon their interventionist policies in the foreign exchange markets for all practical purposes 
other than pursuit for price stability. Any other response to the foreign exchange market represents a 
departure from the IT system. It is argued that attending to inflation targeting and reacting to the 
exchange rate are mutually exclusive. Beyond this assertion, there is also the view that intervention in 
the foreign exchange market could confuse the public regarding the ultimate objective of the central 
bank with respect to its priorities, distorting expectations. In a world of credibility game, such signals 
would be detrimental to the central bank’s authority. 
Another dimension to the problem of using exchange rate as operating variable for smooth transition to 
IT monetary framework is expressed by Calvo and Reinhard (2002) as cited in Jahan (2012). According 
to them, majority of emerging markets are facing problem in performing inflation targeting due to 
various issues of how to manage the exchange rate under the condition that their external debt is 
primarily denominated in U.S. dollars. Since the IT framework is believed to work best under floating 
exchange rate regime, majority of these emerging countries recoil from the idea of adopting the IT 
framework due to too much concern towards exchange rate volatility and its implication for their debt 
stock. Epstein and Yeldan (2006) presented a two-way argument on the importance of effective 
exchange rate policy for an IT framework. According to them, “an exchange rate regime makes central 
bank quite accountable because it has clear-cut goals... but can actually weaken accountability of the 
central banks in emerging- markets countries, by eliminating important signal that can help keep 
monetary policy from becoming too expansionary”. In Nigeria these considerations have featured 
prominently in the debate whether or not to transit to full-fledge IT framework. Mazen and Kay (2012) 
reporting on the Nigerian case said, “We think the CBN is setting policy with its eye on the foreign 
exchange rate and the budget -- more so than inflation on its own”. According to them, while the IMF 
called for a “clear inflation objective” from the CBN, the Bank on its own is insisting that “there isn’t a 
need for an inflation- targeting policy, rather the CBN remains committed to stable prices with an 
implicit target of no more than 10 percent and continue to insist that we must always seek stability that 
is conducive to economic growth”. The extent to which the CBN can achieve this laudable objective 
will largely depend on the ability of the Government to inject fiscal prudence into the polity.  
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6.     RECCOMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1  RECOMMENDATION 
         Over the years, Nigeria has passed through various monetary policy regimes with limited or no success. 
These included exchange rate targeting, direct monetary controls and monetary targeting. The overall objectives 
of monetary policy have been the maintenance of macroeconomic stability and non-inflationary growth. In line 
with the global trend, the country has recently been navigating towards adopting  IT monetary framework for the 
country. So far, positive steps have been taken toward satisfying the requirements for the adoption of IT 
framework. The requirements include the attainment of instrument autonomy for the CBN, commencement of a 
period of disinflation, introduction of Fiscal Responsibility Act to encourage fiscal prudence, introduction of 
financial sector reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of the sector, capital market reforms, adoption of 
flexible exchange rate regime and the adoption of monetary policy rate (MPR) as the operation target of 
monetary policy. 
 Despite these laudable efforts, the country is yet to be fully set for the adoption of full-fledged IT. This 
paper does not consider policy reversal as a feasible option at this time. Rather, efforts should be made to 
consolidate  the gains so far recorded in line with the following suggestions: 
i) The current efforts at achieving disinflation should be sustained through the adoption of fiscal 
prudence and a tight monetary policy. There is therefore, the need for effective policy coordination 
to ensure that the efforts of the Central Bank at ensuring price stability are not scuttled by excessive 
fiscal profligacy on the part of the government. 
ii) The ongoing effort to strengthen the independence of the CBN should be sustained. This will 
enhance the transparency and credibility of the monetary policy and accountability of the CBN. 
iii) The ongoing policy to deepen the capital market through the creation of bonds market to provide 
alternative source of financing government debt should be sustained. 
iv) There is need for the Monetary Policy Committee to draw up a definite time table for the eventual 
take off of IT framework for Nigeria. The transitional period should last between three and five 
years from the time of commencement. 
v) A separate body, the Monetary Policy Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting Committee (MERC), 
should be set up to handle the issues of assessment, monitoring and reporting on macro-economic 
developments with view to evaluating the performance of the programme. Setting up of this body 
will provide a check and balance to the MPC and free the MPC to concentrate on a more daunting 
job of formulating and implementing the policies. 
 
6.2     Conclusion 
              The Inflation Targeting framework at the initial period of adoption will bring about costs in terms of 
slow growth  of output and sticky rise in unemployment as evident in the experience of countries that  currently 
adopt the framework. However, sometime after adoption of IT framework (probably after three or  five years), 
given a congenial macroeconomic environment, there is the chance of gains associated with the framework (rise 
in output, stable prices, rise in employment) exceeding the costs. 
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